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Abstract.  Pacific Salmon are anadromous fish that cross state and international boundaries in their oceanic migrations. Fish
spawned in the rivers of one jurisdiction are vulnerable to harvest in other jurisdictions. The rocky history of attempts by the
United States and Canada to cooperatively manage their respective salmon harvests suggests that environmental variability may
complicate the management of such shared resources. In recent years, an extended breakdown in cooperation was fueled by
strongly divergent trends in Alaskan and southern salmon abundance, and a consequent change in the balance of each nation￿s
interceptions of salmon spawned in the other nation￿s rivers. While several natural and anthropogenic factors contributed to these
trends, there is considerable evidence that changing ocean conditions played a significant role. The period of high productivity
in Alaska contributed to increased Alaskan interceptions of B.C. salmon at a time when Pacific Northwest coho and chinook
could least withstand retaliatory actions on the part of the Canadian fleet. Only recently, has the mounting crisis led to a
fundamental shift in the approach taken by the two nations to determine their respective salmon-harvest shares. On June 30, 1999,
Canada and the U.S. signed an agreement which, if successfully implemented, may lay the groundwork for a more sustainable
cooperative management regime. However, there are many unanswered questions regarding the viability and sustainability of
the new Pacific Salmon Treaty Agreement. This paper draws lessons from the recent period of turmoil to identify strengths and
weaknesses in the new abundance-based management approach, and to suggest avenues for further negotiations to secure more
rational management of Pacific salmon resources.
1. INTRODUCTION
Pacific salmon are anadromous fish. In other words, they
migrate from the ocean to spawn in rivers and streams.
After hatching, the juveniles spend a period of weeks to
years in the freshwater (depending on species and stock),
then disperse into the ocean environment where they feed
and mature before returning to their natal streams to spawn
and die (Pearcy, 1992). While some salmon stocks remain
in coastal areas throughout their lives, many others spend a
year or more in a long-distance migration across the feeding
grounds of the subarctic Pacific. As they migrate across
state and international boundaries, salmon may be subject to
fishing pressure in multiple jurisdictions.
Their anadromous nature makes salmon populations
vulnerable to environmental variability and disturbance in
both the freshwater and marine environments. Salmon are
not unique in their sensitivity to climatic variations. Climate
variations often affect the abundance, location or migratory
patterns of fish populations.  Even when a fishery is entirely
contained within a single jurisdiction, such climate impacts
complicate the difficult task of maintaining economically
efficient and biologically sound harvest management while
balancing the interests of competing harvesters.  When fish
stocks are harvested by more than one nation, or when they
cross internal jurisdictional boundaries, the management
task is further complicated by the efforts of each nation or
jurisdiction to promote the interests of its own harvesters.
The United States and Canada harvest their Pacific Salmon
resources in several interrelated commercial and sport
fisheries. The links among fisheries arise because many of the
salmon that could be harvested close to their spawning
grounds are intercepted earlier, in areas where they are
intermingled with fish from other rivers. These two nations
have a long and rocky history of alternating between
cooperation on salmon management and predatory grabs at
one another’s returning adult salmon. Their faltering attempts
to cooperate illustrate the fragile nature of such cooperation
and the destabilizing role that climate variations can play. 
The most recent breakdown in cooperation began in 1993.
For six years, the U.S. and Canada were unable to agree on
a full set of salmon "fishing regimes" under the terms of the
Pacific Salmon Treaty.  The conflict was sparked by
strongly divergent trends in the abundance of northern and
southern salmon stocks, and a consequent change in the
balance of each nation￿s interceptions of salmon spawned
in the other nation￿s rivers.  Alaska’s salmon harvests (i.e.,
northern) have experienced a remarkable sustained increase
over the past two decades, while harvests of some salmon
stocks in British Columbia, and chinook and coho harvests
in Washington, Oregon and California (i.e., southern) have
fared poorly. These opposite trends allowed Alaska￿s
interceptions of B.C. salmon to increase while B.C.￿s
interceptions of U.S. salmon declined. This destabilized
cooperation by interfering with the Parties￿ ability to
achieve a mutually acceptable interceptions balance.2
Several natural and anthropogenic factors contributed to the
opposite trends in salmon abundance. Habitat loss,
hydropower development, over-harvesting of weak stocks
and poorly-designed hatchery programs have all been cited
as contributing to the decline of salmon stocks along the
U.S. west coast and in parts of British Columbia. 
However, there also is considerable evidence that changing
ocean conditions and climate-related changes in freshwater
environments played a significant role in these declines, as
well as in the dramatic increase in Alaskan salmon
abundance (Hare et al., 1999).
The six-year breakdown in efforts to renegotiate fishing
regimes under the terms of the Pacific Salmon Treaty may
have further jeopardized the troubled southern salmon
stocks. Only recently, has the mounting crisis led to a
fundamental shift in the approach taken by the two nations
to determine their respective salmon-harvest shares. On
June 30, 1999, Canada and the U.S. signed an agreement
which, if successfully implemented, may lay the
groundwork for a more sustainable cooperative management
regime. However, there are many unanswered questions
regarding the viability and sustainability of the new Pacific
Salmon Treaty Agreement. Lessons from the recent period
of turmoil may help to identify strengths and weaknesses in
the new abundance-based management approach, and may
suggest avenues for further negotiations to secure more
rational management of Pacific salmon resources.
This paper begins with an analysis of the failure of the
previous regime-negotiation process, focusing on the roles
played by changing salmon abundance and uncertainty
regarding the causes and magnitude of those changes. We
employ a simple game-theoretic model to show how
climate-related changes in salmon abundance, coupled with
differing interpretations of the Treaty￿s provisions, led to
the collapse in cooperation. The paper discusses the effects
of changing ocean conditions and the Treaty impasse on
harvesting patterns.
We then examine the new Agreement, using insights from
the game-theoretic model to evaluate the benefits and
potential pitfalls of the new approach. We also address
concerns that have been raised by the salmon managers who
must implement its provisions. Finally, we identify potential
opportunities for side-deals to enhance the recovery
prospects for southern salmon populations as well as the
stability of the new Agreement itself.
2. EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
MANAGEMENT
North America￿s commercial fisheries exploit five species
of Pacific salmon:  chinook (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha),
coho (O. kisutch), sockeye (O. nerka), pink (O. gorbuscha),
and chum (O. keta). All five species are harvested in
Alaska, British Columbia and Washington State, while only
coho and chinook are harvested in significant numbers in
Oregon and California.  Sport fisheries for coho and
chinook have grown in the post World War II era, and now
account for a sizeable share of the harvest of these species
outside of Alaska (see e.g., NPAFC, 1999). Steelhead (O.
mykiss) is a related species that is important to in-river
sports fisheries, but it is neither commercially targeted nor
significantly affected by marine fisheries, and thus is not
subject to international management.
When the rapid growth of commercial harvests in the late
19
th and early 20
th centuries threatened to deplete salmon
runs, all jurisdictions created agencies to regulate gear and
fishing seasons. However, these authorities could never
fully control harvests of the salmon stocks within their
purview, because many salmon could be caught as they
passed through the waters of neighboring jurisdictions on
their return migration.  Such "interceptions" became
increasingly important over time as fishing effort expanded
in offshore areas.
The first significant international agreement on salmon
harvests was a Convention between the United States and
Canada, signed in 1930 and ratified in 1937.  That
agreement divided the harvest of Fraser River sockeye
salmon as well as management and restoration costs equally
between the two nations (Munro and Stokes, 1989).   The
agreement was later extended to Fraser River pink salmon.
Under that Convention, the International Pacific Salmon
Fishery Commission (IPSFC) regulated harvests of the
Fraser River stocks.  Although the Fraser River lies entirely
in Canada, a large portion of the salmon spawning in that
drainage typically approach the river through the Strait of
Juan de Fuca where, historically, they had been harvested
by Washington State fishing vessels.  When rock slides
blocked access to part of their spawning habitat, and sent
the Fraser’s salmon resources into decline, the U.S. and
Canada had a clear joint interest in removing the blockage
and restoring the runs.
Support for the Convention began to evaporate during the
1960s. The Canadians had become increasingly unhappy
about their agreement to share one half of the Fraser River
salmon with the U.S. because, by foregoing construction of
hydropower dams on the Fraser, Canada was effectively3
bearing more than half of the cost of maintaining those runs.
Developments in international law arising from the United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) also
perhaps contributed to Canadian perceptions that a 50-50
split of the Fraser harvest was an inequitable arrangement.
By the mid-1970s, the international community had
articulated a principle of  management preeminence for the
nation of origin of anadromous stocks (Shepard and Argue,
1998). This was expressed in Article 66 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as follows:
States in whose rivers anadromous stocks originate
shall have the primary interest in and responsibility for
such stocks. (United Nations, 1982). 
Another inadequacy of the Fraser River agreement was that
it covered only a portion of the salmon runs jointly
exploited by the U.S. and Canada.  When negotiations for
the Pacific Salmon Treaty began in 1971, Alaskan
interceptions of salmon spawned in the rivers of
Washington and Oregon were creating tensions among the
states while increasing Canadian troll harvests of those
stocks precluded an effective internal solution.  In addition,
mutual interceptions of salmon of Canadian and Alaskan
origin were seen as a barrier to effective management in the
northern area (Yanagida, 1987). While negotiations for the
new Treaty proceeded over the next 14 years, British
Columbia maintained intense pressure on the southward-
bound U.S. coho and chinook stocks.  As Washington and
Oregon’s harvests of these species declined, particularly in
the wake of the 1982-83 El Niæo, Canada’s "fish war"
strategy succeeded in convincing the southern U.S. parties
to support the proposed treaty (Munro and Stokes, 1989;
Munro et al., 1998). 
Alaska, however, showed little interest in reaching an
agreement until the Pacific Northwest Treaty Tribes filed
suit to extend the 50-50 sharing rule established by the
landmark Boldt decision (United States v. Washington,
[W.D. Wash. 1974]) to restrict Alaskan harvests of chinook
originating in the rivers of the Pacific Northwest (Yanagida,
1987; Munro et al., 1998).  Language in the U.S. Senate’s
implementation act (1985) and a  side-agreement between
Alaska and the tribes in Confederated Tribes and Bands v.
Baldridge (W.D. Wash. 1985) broke the impasse.  Under
the settlement,  Alaska, the Northwest states, and the tribes
obtained  representation and a veto within the U.S.
delegation to the  joint Commission, and  the tribes agreed
to give up their right to litigate north/south chinook
allocations (Stevens, 1986; Yanagida, 1987).  
 
The 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty created the Pacific Salmon
Commission whose primary task was to develop and
recommend ￿fishing regimes￿ intended to govern the overall
harvest and allocation of the salmon stocks jointly exploited
by the U.S. and Canada.  The body of the Treaty lays out a
set of general principles to guide the Commission in this
task.  Of central importance are the equity and conservation
objectives, which the Treaty expresses as follows:
...each Party shall conduct its fisheries and its salmon
enhancement programs so as to:
a) prevent overfishing and provide for optimum
production; and
b) provide for each Party to receive benefits
equivalent to the production of salmon originating
in its waters. (Pacific Salmon Treaty, Article III).
The treaty then advises the Parties to consider the following
factors:  the desirability of reducing interceptions, the
desirability of avoiding disruption of existing fisheries and
annual variations in abundances of the stocks.  These
considerations are somewhat mutually inconsistent because
many of the existing fisheries relied heavily on
interceptions.
The bargaining framework implemented in 1985 called for
frequent renegotiation of these fishing regimes.
Negotiations for new regimes were to follow a consensus
rule. That rule gave an effective veto over proposed fishing
regimes to the Canadian delegation, as well as to any of the
three voting U.S. Commissioners  ￿ representing Alaska,
Washington/Oregon, and the Treaty Indian Nations
(Yanagida, 1987; Miller, 1996; Schmidt, 1996; Munro et
al., 1998; McDorman, 1998a). When the parties failed to
agree on fishing regimes, regulatory authority reverted to
the appropriate state or federal jurisdiction. In the U.S., the
states have authority within three nautical miles of the coast
and federal jurisdiction (exercised by regional management
councils) extends from 3 to 200 miles offshore.
Until the June 1999 amendments to the Treaty, the fishing
regimes consisted primarily of harvest ceilings for specific
locations and species.  For example, in 1985 and 1986, the
annual all-gear harvest of chinook in northern and central
British Columbia and southeast Alaska was to be limited to
526,000 fish divided equally between the parties (Pacific
Salmon Treaty, Annex IV, Chapter 3). In the South, the
U.S. harvest of Fraser sockeye was to be held to a cap of 7
million fish over each of two successive 4 year periods
(Pacific Salmon Treaty, Annex IV, Chapter 4). 
Although the intent of the Treaty was to control
interceptions of fish produced in other jurisdictions, the
difficulty of identifying the true origins of fish taken in an
ongoing mixed-stock fishery led to the harvest ceiling
approach as a proxy method for balancing interceptions. In
addition, harvest ceilings may have been viewed as a tool4
for reconciling the apparently conflicting goals of the treaty.
In the absence of major environmental changes, ceilings
could both reward enhancement investments on the part of
the nation of origin and avoid disruption of existing
fisheries. The Fraser River cap did indeed ￿avoid
disruption￿ of the existing U.S. Fraser harvest, while
protecting the benefits to Canada from its investments in
enhancement.  
However, under the Treaty￿s equity clause, the Canadians
expected that the right of the U.S. to continue harvesting
Fraser River salmon would be contingent upon equivalent
Canadian  harvests of U.S. salmon stocks. In particular, they
expected that Canadian vessels operating along the west
coast of Vancouver Island would be able to capture
sufficient coho and chinook of Washington and Oregon
origin to roughly offset U.S. harvests of the Fraser River
stocks. Initially, this arrangement appeared satisfactory, but
within a few years, Pacific Northwest coho and chinook
stocks declined precipitously. It soon became apparent that
the U.S. could no longer pay for its allocation of the Fraser
harvest in this way.
During the long period of negotiation leading to the 1985
Treaty, changes were already apparent in the ocean
environment that would contribute to the Treaty￿s undoing.
In the mid-1970s, ocean conditions in the North Pacific
changed dramatically. An extended period of cool coastal
sea surface temperatures (SSTs), that had been favorable to
U.S. west coast salmon production, gave way to much
warmer conditions along the west coast of North America.
This shift may be part of a long-term pattern of interdecadal
oscillation in the climate of the North Pacific (Mantua et al.,
1997; Zhang et al., 1996; Latif and Barnett, 1996). An
unusual sequence of closely-spaced ENSO warm events
from 1977 to 1998 reinforced the decadal-scale shift to
warmer coastal SSTs and cooler SSTs in the central north
Pacific and contributed to a pattern of intensified winter
Aleutian lows (Trenberth and Hurrell 1994; Trenberth and
Hoar 1996). These changes in the ocean environment
appear to have had positive effects on salmon abundance in
the Gulf of Alaska, but negative effects on stocks that spend
a portion of their lives in the California Current (Pearcy
1992; Hare et al., 1999).  In the subarctic zone, the mixed
layer became shallower.  This may have enhanced the
survival of Alaskan and Northern B.C. salmon smolts by
increasing zooplankton productivity and, therefore, food
abundance for juvenile salmon  (Polovina et al. 1995;
Brodeur and Ware 1992).  A general pattern of winter
warming and increased winter precipitation in Alaska
(Mantua et al., 1997) also may have contributed to favorable
stream conditions for egg-to-smolt survival.  From southern
British Columbia southward, El Niæo events have been
associated with poor feeding conditions for maturing
salmon, and changes in species composition, including
increased abundance of some species that prey on juvenile
salmon (Pearcy, 1992).  In addition, recent droughts in
California and the Pacific Northwest have resulted in poor
conditions for spawning and migration in the salmon’s
freshwater phase.  Changes in ocean temperatures and
circulation, and associated changes in stream conditions,
thus appear to have contributed to the opposite trends in
northern and southern salmon abundance.
Shortly after the apparent mid-1970s climatic regime-shift,
Alaskan salmon harvests entered a period of dramatic
increase, rising nearly ten-fold from a low of 22 million
salmon (of all species) in 1974 to three successive record
highs in 1993, 1994 and 1995 (Figure 1).  At the 1995 peak,
Alaska harvested a total of 217 million salmon.  Harvests of
most salmon species in northern British Columbia also fared
well during this period, although B.C.’s chinook harvests
have declined steadily (Hare et al., 1999; PSC Chinook
Technical Committee, 1999), and by the late 1990s it had
become apparent that many of B.C.￿s southern and interior
coho stocks were severely depleted (Pacific Fisheries
Resource Conservation Council, 1999).  Southward, salmon
harvests have been on a roller-coaster.  Commercial chinook
and coho catches in California, Oregon, and Washington
dropped abruptly in the late 1970s, hitting El Niæo-related
lows in 1983 and 1984.  A dramatic but brief recovery in
1986 and 1987 then gave way to a precipitous decline to
record low harvests in recent years (Figure 2).  Abundance
has declined to the point that some stocks are on the verge
of extinction.  
The tendency for inverse fluctuations in Alaskan and
southern salmon abundance can be seen by comparing
harvests of a single species, coho (Figure 3). During the
coastal cool period, immediately prior to the mid-1970s
regime shift, U.S. west coast coho harvests exceeded
Alaskan harvests, while the opposite condition has prevailed
since that time.
The period of high productivity in Alaska induced Alaskan
harvesters to fish harder in areas where B.C. salmon are
intermingled with Alaskan fish. In particular, the dramatic
increase in pink salmon abundance in southeastern Alaska
led to increased interceptions of Canadian sockeye from the
Skeena, Nass and other northern B.C. rivers. Alaskan
officials argued that they could not avoid increased
interceptions of Canadian salmon without foregoing
efficient harvest of Alaska￿s own salmon.5
The Canadians, however, found themselves unable to
redress the growing interceptions imbalance because
declining southern coho and chinook stocks prevented
Canadian harvesters from reaching the agreed-upon ceilings
for harvests of those stocks along the west coast of
Vancouver Island. At the same time, fishing interests along
the U.S. West Coast claimed that Canada’s efforts to reach
the ceilings resulted in over harvesting of those fragile
stocks.
Figure 1: Alaskan Commercial Harvest - All Salmon  Species
     Figure 2: Commercial Coho & Chinook Harvest-Washington, Oregon, & California
In addition, the generally warmer coastal SSTs since the
mid-1970s appear to have contributed to an increase in the
proportion of Fraser River sockeye returning via the
northern route, through Johnstone Strait rather than through
the Strait of Juan de Fuca, which is shared with Washington
State.  This change in migratory behavior has tended to limit6
U.S. access to those stocks and favor Canadian harvest.
While the estimated Johnstone diversion rate averaged
19.5% during the 1960s and 1970s, it has averaged 50.7%
during the past two decades (Data supplied by Jim Woodey,
PSC).  As can be seen in Figure 4, SSTs were much warmer
in the Gulf of Alaska and along the B.C. coast in the latter
period than in the former.  
Negotiations first began to break down in 1993 when the
parties failed to renew some expired fishing regimes. The
dispute escalated the following year when the Canadian
delegation broke off the negotiations, charging that the
growing interceptions imbalance violated Canada’s
interpretation of the Treaty’s equity provisions. As the
Treaty dispute escalated, the Canadians employed a variety
Figure 3: Commercial Coho Harvests
of desperate tactics in an effort to force the U.S. back to the
bargaining table.  For example, in 1994, British Columbia
tried to pressure the southern U.S. parties by pursuing an
"aggressive fishing strategy".  That strategy failed to win
any concessions and resulted in dangerous overharvesting
of part of the Fraser River sockeye run by the Canadian
fleet (Fraser River Sockeye Public Review Board, 1995). 
That experience, and mounting concern over the state of the
southern coho and chinook stocks led to a partial agreement
between Canada and the southern U.S. Parties in 1995, but
Alaska remained outside the agreement and the truce proved
to be temporary.  By the summer of 1997, British
Columbia’s salmon harvesters had become so frustrated that
approximately 150 fishing vessels participated in a blockade
that held the Alaska Ferry hostage in the Canadian port of
Prince Rupert for three days (Hogben et al., 1997; D’oro,
1997).  Canadian frustration was fueled by Alaska￿s
unwillingness to take actions to reduce the interceptions
imbalance. Such concessions made little sense from
Alaska￿s standpoint because they would impose costs on
Alaska without commensurate benefits. 
The dispute festered until the new Agreement was signed in
1999.  Even now, it is unclear whether this Agreement will
prove to be yet another temporary truce or a first step to
lasting cooperative management.
3. GAME THEORETIC INSIGHTS ON
INTERNATIONAL HARVEST ALLOCATIONS
In order to better understand why it has been so difficult to
achieve and maintain cooperation in this case, it is helpful
to formally model the bargaining process among the Parties
to the Treaty. The theory of games is a particularly valuable
tool in this context.
Game theory is designed to analyze strategic interactions
among independent, self-interested players. The players are
modeled as rationally choosing a strategy on the basis of
expected payoffs, given the likely actions of the other
players over the entire sequence of play. Interactions among
the players can be modeled as occurring only once or
repeated many times; and as involving different levels of
information and communication among the players. A7
repeated game is ￿dynamic￿ if the initial conditions and
expected payoffs  at the start of each period of play change
as a result of the players￿ past actions. A game also can be
￿stochastic￿ if exogenous variability (e.g. environmental
factors) affect starting conditions and payoffs. The two
main categories of games ￿cooperative￿ and ￿non-
cooperative￿ differ in that the players in a cooperative game
are assumed to be able to communicate freely, while
communication is faulty or non-existent in ￿non-
cooperative￿ games. A game is said to have a ￿solution￿ if
the players￿ interactions result in a stable outcome.
However, many games do not have such a solution. 
Figure 4: Gulf of Alaska and B.C. Coast.  Temparature anomalies (deg. C)
When applied to international fisheries, the ￿players￿ in the
game are the respective national authorities who either
choose to set independent policies governing harvests by
their respective fleets, or to negotiate coordinated fishing
policies with the other national authority(ies).  In a game
theoretic model, any agreement on harvest allocations
results from hard bargaining among these players. 
One can model the regime-setting process under the Pacific
Salmon Treaty as a dynamic cooperative game. Such games
may or may not result in a cooperative agreement regarding
division of the harvest.  If cooperation is achieved, it is not
motivated by altruism, but by the possibility that all parties
can gain by avoiding the destructive consequences of non-
cooperation.  To be stable and efficient, a cooperative
solution must satisfy the following conditions:  1) the
solution must be "Pareto optimal," which means that it must
not be possible to make one player better off without
harming the other(s) and 2) the individual rationality
constraint for each player must be met, which means that it
must not be possible for any player to do better by refusing
to cooperate (Munro et al., 1998). 
Figure 5 illustrates a simple two party game. The curved
line in this figure is the Pareto boundary that satisfies





which represents the payoffs available to parties 1 and 2
when their fleets fall back to a narrowly self-interested (and
mutually destructive) competition.  Neither fleet will agree
to accept less from a cooperative arrangement than it could
achieve unilaterally (the ￿principle of individual
rationality￿).  Therefore, in the absence of side-payments,
the ￿bargaining set￿ effectively would be confined to that
(darkened) segment of the Pareto boundary which lies
between the horizontal and vertical lines passing through
the threat point.
Cooperation can "pay" in an international fishery because it
can dramatically expand the overall size and sustainability
of the harvest.  This year’s harvesting activities affect both
net returns this year and the size of potential harvests in
future years.  If cooperation leads to better conservation
and/or lower harvesting costs, all parties can benefit.  In
addition, the total value of the harvest depends on how it is
allocated among the nations exploiting the fish stock. The
allocation problem is not a zero-sum game because the
marginal utility to either party of a change in its share of the
total salmon run is not constant. Rather, the first increments
allocated to either party are likely to be used to serve
important conservation, cultural and recreational uses. This8
is represented in Figure 5 by the convex shape of the Pareto
boundary￿i.e. bulging upward at its center. Near the
northwest corner of the Pareto boundary, the value to party
1 of an increment in its share of the run may be very high,
but that marginal value would tend to decline as one moves
downward and to the right along the frontier.
Simultaneously the marginal utility to party 2 grows, more
than offsetting the former’s decline. The convexity feature
affirms that there is substantial added utility to be achieved
through cooperation￿a bonus beyond the purely biological
consequence of enhanced stock productivity. Therefore, the
total payoff to the binational community, U1+U2, will be
maximized at some cooperative mix of shared landings.  
This very simple model can be used to make several points
relevant to the Pacific salmon management problem. First,
the bargaining set depicted in this figure is fairly large, 
Figure 5
suggesting the existence of many joint harvesting
arrangements that are preferable to the non-cooperative
threat point.  Second, if the parties￿ utilities are given equal
weight, then there is one coordinated management
arrangement which maximizes total community utility. This
corresponds to the point P￿the point of tangency of the
Pareto boundary of the feasibility set with a 45 degree line.
If the scope of bargaining is confined to arrangements in
which each party benefits only from its own harvests, then the
set of possible outcomes is limited to those shown by the
darkened segment of the convex Pareto boundary.  However,
if the parties are also willing to allow other payments change
hands, then they could achieve an expanded bargaining set.
Efficient harvesting at point P, coupled with side payments,
would cause the 45 degree line to become the expanded
Pareto boundary.  With this expanded bargaining set, the
benefits of efficient harvesting could be allocated between the
parties through the use of side payments (monetary or in-
kind), or by allowing the nationals of one jurisdiction to
participate in the fishery located in the other jurisdiction (i.e.,
an access agreement).  Any point within the darkened
segment of the 45 degree line would both maximize the sum
of the players utilities and satisfy their individual rationality.
However, throughout the history of U.S./Canadian Pacific
Salmon negotiations, the allocation of benefits never has
been decoupled from the allocation of the harvest in this
way. Rather, the only options that have been considered are
those in which the benefits accruing to each nation depend
on its own harvests. In effect, this has constrained the
bargaining set to a subset of the possible arrangements.
We now can examine how climatic shifts may have affected
cooperation between the two nations.  By altering the spatial
distribution of salmon abundance, a climatic regime shift
changes the relative payoffs to non-cooperative versus
cooperative behavior.  In other words, the position of the
threat point is sensitive to a change in climatic conditions
affecting salmon survival rates. 9
One possible outcome is simply a change in the relative
strength of the parties￿ bargaining positions. Such a
situation is depicted in Figure 6.  For simplicity assume that
side payments are not considered within bargaining
framework (as has been the historical case for the Pacific
Salmon Treaty).  Suppose that the threat point is initially at
T
o and the parties have struck an agreement within the
bargaining set A-B.  A climatic shift then occurs which
favors party 2’s stocks and changes the position of the threat
point to T
1. There is still  plenty of room for mutually 
advantageous cooperation within the new bargaining set C-
D, but the original deal no longer will be acceptable to party
2.  Party 2, in fact, now can do better by refusing to
cooperate than by adhering to the original agreement.  In
such a situation, renegotiation of the terms of cooperation
will be necessary to avoid a retreat to mutually destructive
competition.  If the other party misjudges the change in
circumstances and insists on clinging to the original
agreement, or if the negotiation process is excessively slow
and costly, a breakdown in cooperation could occur.
Figure 6
Figure 710
Another possibility is that a change in abundance patterns
may so advantage one of the players that cooperation no
longer pays from that party￿s perspective.  If it is costly to
negotiate and enforce a harvest agreement, the new threat
point could lie above the Pareto frontier, as depicted in
Figure 7.  In that case, the only way to achieve cooperation
would be to use side payments to induce that party to
cooperate.  Cooperation in such a case would likely collapse
if the parties failed to consider side-payment or access
agreement options, insisting instead that the distribution of
benefits remain strictly tied to the distribution of the
harvest. 
We might suppose that when the Pacific Salmon Treaty was
signed in 1985, the parties perceived the threat point as




2] in Figure 5.
Given that, they were able to agree to a pattern of harvesting
that roughly satisfied individual rationality and their notions
of a ￿fair￿ distribution of the harvest based on the equity
principle articulated in the Treaty.  
In actuality, Alaska never had much to gain by participating
in the Pacific Salmon Treaty.  Salmon migration patterns
give Alaska a natural advantage in exploiting chinook
salmon from the southern U.S. jurisdictions and certain
Canadian stocks while Alaskan-origin salmon are less
vulnerable to interception. When climatic conditions
increasingly favored Alaskan salmon, Alaska had even less
to gain by cooperating with Canadian and southern U.S.
interests. If we think of Alaska as ￿party 2,￿ this situation
would be analogous to a shift in the threat point from a
position like  T
0 to T
1  in Figure 6 or perhaps even to a point
such as that depicted in Figure 7.
Canada￿s bargaining position vis Æ vis the southern U.S.
parties was similarly strengthened by the effects of the
climatic regime shift. The high Johnstone Strait diversion
rates in recent years has enhanced B.C.￿s ability to increase
its share of that fishery.
Our discussion, thus far, has focused on shifts in the
balance of competitive advantage.  We have largely
abstracted from notions of stock ownership or ￿equity￿ as
described in Article III of the Treaty.  Indeed, from an
￿equity￿ standpoint, the notion of rewarding the party
whose competitive position has improved might appear
objectionable.  However, this analysis suggests that if one
ignores the reality of individual rationality, and the
instability of incentives to cooperate, it may be impossible
to maintain cooperation.  It would be equally dangerous to
ignore notions of ￿fairness.￿  Indeed, Canada￿s claim that
the Treaty￿s equity provisions were being violated was a
central feature of the recent dispute.  
￿Equity￿ involves a question of ownership￿the principle
that a nation should be able to capture the benefits arising
from harvest of the salmon originating in its waters. To
examine the significance of ownership using our simple
diagrams, consider the extreme case depicted in Figure 8.
Here, suppose that only one stock is involved, and that stock
is the acknowledged property of party 2. In that case, a
distribution of benefits within the line segment EF would
both recognize party 2￿s undisputed ownership of the stock
and satisfy the individual rationality of both parties. To
achieve such a point, the value of part of the harvest taken
in the fisheries of jurisdiction 1 would have to be
reallocated to party 2. Again, that could be accomplished
through monetary payments, payments in kind, or an access
agreement.
There also might be circumstances in which one party is in
a very powerful position with respect to its ability to
intercept the salmon returning to spawn in the other
jurisdiction. In that case, the added value achieved by
operating the fishery at point P would be sufficient to
achieve EITHER  fleet 1’s  individual rationality OR fleet
2’s full equity rights￿but not both simultaneously.  The
only way  to accomplish that is to inject value from outside
of this single-stock fishery.  This case is depicted in Figure
9￿ where party 2 is the owner of the stock while party 1
could easily intercept a large fraction of the run in a
competitive fishery. Any agreement in this case would
involve either balancing the division of benefits in this
fishery against the division in another, or side-payments
from outside the fishery sector.
Both countries seem to have recognized this problem, and
agree that equity claims need only be balanced in the
aggregate.  To this we would add that individual rationality
claims need also to be adjusted, but that this too needs only
to be achieved in the aggregate.  As an example,  when the
parties signed the 1985 Treaty, Canada implicitly assumed
that it would balance Canadian harvest of Pacific Northwest
chinook and coho against the US harvest of Fraser sockeye.
It appears that they hoped to meet equity and individual
rationality requirements simultaneously by pairing two
groups of  transboundary stocks which are separately
targeted and have different countries of origin.  As we have
seen, that hope was thwarted by the subsequent changes in
stock abundance.
4. CURRENT AGREEMENT AND PROSPECTS
FOR THE FUTURE
The 1999 Agreement represents a dramatic break from the
previous approach. Rather than relying on short-lived,
ceiling-based regimes whose frequent renegotiation11
provided ample opportunity for disagreement and
brinkmanship, the new Agreement establishes a long-term
commitment to define harvest shares as a function of the
abundance of each salmon species in the areas covered by
the Treaty. For example, for the next 12 years, the U.S.
share of Fraser River sockeye will be fixed at 16.5% of the
annual harvest. This represents a decrease from the post-
1985 average U.S. share of 20.5%, but an increase relative
to the share actually attained by the U.S. fleet during the 
1992-1997 salmon war period (DFO, 1999; O￿Neil, 1999a).
This percentage approach allows the number of Fraser River
sockeye harvested by the U.S. fleet to increase in years of
high sockeye abundance while requiring reduced harvests
when abundance is depressed. In contrast, in the 1985
Treaty, U.S. harvests of Fraser sockeye were to be held to
a cap of 7 million fish over each of two successive 4 year
periods (Pacific Salmon Treaty, Annex 4). 
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based on indices of the aggregate abundance of chinook
present in the fishery; 2) individual stock-based
management (ISBM) fisheries, which are primarily located
in inside fishing areas, will be managed based on the status
of individual stocks or groups of stocks (e.g., on the basis of
the evolving status of currently endangered or threatened
stocks).  Abundance-based allocation rules for coho have
not yet been developed, but the Agreement instructs the
Parties to jointly develop such a management approach, and
specifies various deadlines for the accomplishment of
particular tasks.
Another major feature of the Agreement is its provision for
two endowment funds.  Initial funding is to be provided
entirely by the U.S., but either Party may make additional
contributions, and even third parties may contribute, with
the agreement of the Parties.  The annual investment
earnings on the Northern Boundary and Transboundary
Rivers Restoration and Enhancement Fund (Northern
Fund), and Southern Boundary Restoration and
Enhancement Fund (Southern Fund) are to be used to
support scientific research, habitat restoration and
enhancement of wild stock production in their respective
areas.  The funds are to be managed by committees
composed of representatives appointed by the federal
governments of Canada and the United States.  The
Agreement is contingent upon U.S. Congressional approval
of U.S. contributions of $75 million for the Northern Fund
and $65 million for the Southern Fund over a four-year
period.  The first installments have been approved.  These
funds appear to be intended to serve as the type of side-
payment suggested above, although their yield will be far
smaller than the debt that Canada had claimed that it was
owed for the accumulated harvest imbalance.  The Northern
Fund also may be aimed at "sweetening the pot" for Alaska
because a portion of the available money will be spent in
support of Alaskan research and enhancement (O￿Neil,
1999b).
At the very least, the side-payment aspect of the
Endowment Funds sets a precedent that may work to
overcome a long standing prejudice on the part of many
Canadians against taking monetary payments in lieu of fish
to achieve an equitable balance of fishery benefits.
While their initial yield will be quite small, the Endowment
Funds may constitute a vehicle for more extensive future
side-payments.  The provision allowing third parties to
contribute to the funds raises numerous possibilities for
efficiency-enhancing side deals.  For example, it might be
possible for a coalition of Pacific Northwest hydropower,
environmental and development interests to use the
Endowment Funds to compensate Alaskan and B.C.
harvesters in order to secure ￿safe-passage￿ for endangered
Columbia Basin and Puget Sound chinook.  Future work on
this project will investigate the feasibility of such
arrangements.  Such privately funded payments to reduce
ocean harvesting of salmon have been pioneered in the
North Atlantic, where the North Atlantic Salmon Fund
(NASF) has coordinated the buy-out of ocean commercial
fishing for salmon in Greenland, Icelandland, The Faroes
and Wales (NASF, 2000).
Most observers agree that the 1999 Agreement is better than
limping along from year to year without an agreement, but
it is not yet clear if the new abundance-based management
approach will provide a path to sustainable cooperation.
While the focus on conservation will tend to protect some
of the weak stocks that were jeopardized by the recent
turmoil, the new Agreement does little to resolve long-
standing differences over the division of benefits.  In
particular, many Canadians remain convinced that Canada
will come out ￿short￿ under this Agreement, and they have
labeled it ￿profoundly disappointing￿ (Culbert and Beatty,
1999).  In fact, the Canadian government effectively agreed
to temporarily suspend the argument about equity by
agreeing that: ￿...compliance with this Agreement shall
constitute compliance by the Parties with their obligations
under Article III of the Treaty￿(McRae and Pipkin, 1999).
Some Canadians are unhappy about the long-term
implications of the Agreement because they feel that it risks
committing them to an unsatisfactory arrangement for many
years.  In fact, the Canadian delegation had unsuccessfully
argued for a shorter term.  Although the Parties have
formally stipulated that compliance with the terms of the
new Agreement shall be deemed to fulfill the requirements
of Article III of the Treaty, the stipulation applies only for
the duration of the current agreement.  If Canadians
continue to feel that their interests have been compromised,
there may be renewed turmoil when this Agreement expires.
Abundance-based management also will place a greater
burden on fishery scientists to develop accurate and timely
estimates of abundance.  Given inevitable uncertainties,
there will continue to be considerable scope for
disagreements regarding these projections.  McDorman
(1998b) notes for example that: 
The potential for scientific and data disagreements is
simply too overwhelming to expect complete harmony.
In the event of non-agreement on management
measures within the Pacific Salmon Commission, it can
be expected that each country will proceed with its own
management plans declaring itself to be consistent with
the complexities of the 1999 Agreement. (p. 112).13
He worries that this could simply leave the parties
exactly where they were before: ￿...where the two
states and their representatives found disharmony to be
in their national interest.￿(McDorman, 1998b, p. 112).
At this point, we would have to agree with
McDorman￿s conclusion.  ￿It is too soon to tell whether
the 1999 Agreement is a continuation of the past or
whether it represents a turning point for the
future.￿(p.112).
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